In Sections 1-3, the classical theory of the comparison of two experiments is reviewed with particular reference to the comparison of two location experiments. It is shown that the requirement of domination of one experiment by another for all decision problems is too strong to provide a reasonable basis for comparison. For oneparameter problems with monotone likelihood ratio it is therefore proposed to restrict the comparison to decision problems which are monotone in the sense of Karlin and Rubin (1956). Application of this weaker definition to the location problem is shown to give satisfactory results. A scale-free comparison of this type leads to a new tailordering of distributions, and this is explored in Section 6.
1.
Introduction. An experiment E is a random quantity X and a family P = {Po, 0 E Q2} of possible distributions of X. Let F = ( Y,Q -{QO, 0 e II}) be another experiment, with the distributions PO and QO corresponding to the same state of nature 0. The idea of patterning the definition of one experiment being more informative than another on the concept of sufficiency was initiated in an unpublished memorandum by Bohnenblust, Shapley and Sherman and developed into a theory by Blackwell (1951 Blackwell ( , 1953 . DEFINITION (1.1). The experiment F is more informative than (or sufficient for) E if there exists a random quantity Z with known distribution and a function h such that for all 0 E Q Y is distributed as QO => h(Y,Z) is distributed as PO.
An immediate consequence of (1.1) is: (1.2)For any decision procedure 6 based on X and any loss function L (0,d ) there exists a (possibly randomized) procedure 6' based on Y such that R (0,6') = R (0,6) for all 0.
It was shown by Blackwell, and under more general conditions by Le Cam (1964) and Feldman and Ramamoorthi (1986) that typically not only does (1.1) imply (1.2) but the inverse implication also holds. In fact, in the same papers it is shown that (1.1) is implied by the following apparently even weaker statement * Research supported by National Science Foundation DMS84-01388. -2 - (1.3)Statement (1.2) with the conclusion R (0,6') = R (0,6) for all 0 replaced by R (0,6') < R (0,6) for all 0. A fourth condition which typically is equivalent to (1.1)-(1.3) is the Bayes condition that given any prior distribution A for 0, the Bayes risk is no larger when the experiment is based on Y than when it is based on X.
If Y is more informative in the sense of these definitions, which are equivalent in the situations to be considered in this paper, we shall write Y > X. If Y > X and X > Y, the experiments X and Y will be said to be equivalent (Y -X). The experiment Y is strictly more informat'ive than X(Y > X) if it is more informative than X but not equivalent to it.
The various possibilities are illustrated by the following example. The normal example suggests the possibility that such comparisons may be more readily available when G differs from F only by a scale factor, say PROBLEM 2: P and Q are given by (2.1) with (2.4)
This problem has been considered by Stone (1961) and Goel and DeGroot (1979) . A necessary and sufficient condition for Y given by (2.4) to be more informative than X is that (2.5) ¢(t) = ,x(t) is acharacteristic function for all 0 < p < 1.
Ox(Pt )
As was pointed out by Goel and DeGroot, the distributions F whose characteris- Thus, iL(t) is the characteristic function of a variable which is equal to 0 with probability p2 and has density f (x) with probability 1 -p2.
On the other hand, let F(z) be any distribution whose support is a finite interval such as the uniform or triangular distribution. Then F cannot be selfdecomposable since it is not infinitely divisible. 
2k' 2k This is easily checked and well known.
(ii) To prove that Y is not more informative than X for p $ k we shall exhibit a statistical task which X can perform in this case but Y can not. For this purpose, consider the estimation of (iii) Throughout the literature on the comparison of experiments, the suggestion occurs of comparing two experiments not for all decision problems but only for some family C of problems. For such restricted comparisons, (1.3) is the relevant determining condition. So as to distinguish this approach from the classical one, we shall say that Y is more effective than X with respect to the class C of decision problems concerning 0 if for any problem in C (specified by a set of possible decisions and a loss function) and any decision procedure for this problem based on X, there exists a procedure 6' based on Y such that R (0,6') < R (0,6) for all 0. It is this last approach with which we shall be concerned in the remainder of this paper. More particularly we shall be interested in defining a class C which is large enough to include most of the statistical problems of interest, but not so large that comparability becomes practically impossible.
A suitable such class was introduced by Karlin and Rubin (1956) for the case that 0 is a real-valued parameter. This class, the class of monotone procedures, which we shall denote by M is defined in terms of the decision space and the permissible loss functions. It may be loosely described as follows. (For more detail, see Karlin and Rubin (1956 Pp(X < x) = Fp(x) and Q0(Y < y) =-G y). PROOF. By the KR -theorem, attention can be restricted to the ability of Y to dominate any monotone procedure 6 based on X, i.e. to prove the existence of a procedure 6' based on Y with risk uniformly no greater than that of 6. Although this is not required for the proof, the construction will produce a monotone 6'. Assuming (5.2), we begin by showing that for any 00 and any 0 < a < 1, given any level a test of H : 0 < 00 against 0 > 0o based on X, there exists a test for the same problem based on Y which is uniformly at least as powerful for 0 > 0o and uniformly at most as powerful for 0 < 00.
Since there exist tests based on X and Y respectively that are simultaneously uniformly most powerful against 0 > 0o and uniformly least powerful against 0 < 00, it is enough to show that the claimed relationship holds for these two tests. The optimal test based on X is given by the rejection region X > a and that based on Y by Y > b, where for the sake of simplicity we assume for the moment that no randomization is required and that the points a and b are 
Condition (5.5) states that F is more spread out than G in the sense that any two quantities are at least as far apart under F than they are under G. These are just the circumstances under which one would expect inferences about the location of F to be more difficult than those about the location of G. Restriction to monotone problems has thus replaced the original rather strange and -as it turned out -not very useful condition (2.2) with one that nicely quantifies our intuition.
Condition (5.5) was discussed in Bickel and Lehmann (1976) as the definition of F being more spread out than G. It was also pointed out there that if F1 and G-1 are differentiable, (5.5) is equivalent to (5.6) f [F-(y)I < 1 for all 0 < y < 1.
Still another equivalent condition is given in Theorem 1 of Bickel and Lehmann.
Let us finally specialize the above results to Problem 2, defined by (2.4).
Since in that case G(y) = F(y/p), 0 < p < 1, we have G-'(y) = pF-'(y), and it is seen that (5.5) holds for all F. We have thus proved THEOREM 5.3. Let the distributions of X and Y be given by (2.4) and suppose that F has a density f which is strongly unimodal. Then Y is more effective than X relative to M for all 0 < p < 1.
Since the uniform distribution is strongly unimodal, this establishes in particular the conjecture expressed at the end of Section 3 for any loss function meeting the KR conditions of case 1 of Section 4. The ratio therefore attains its maximum at y -1/2 and if f is bounded, (6.3) implies (6.2).
As discussed by Loh (1984b) , Van Zwet's s-ordering and some related orderings (including Loh's t-ordering) take into account not only the heaviness of the tail but also the behavior of f (its "peakedness") at the center. In contrast, condition (6. 2) provides a definition of pure tail-ordering. As an example, if G is double exponential and F Cauchy, then F is not tail-heavier according to the sordering, but it is strictly tail-heavier according to the ordering (6.2) since (see Parzen where here and below -means that the ratio tends to a positive finite construct as u --1. As another example, note that according to the s-ordering, the double exponential is heavier-tailed than the logistic, while the two are equivalent according to the ordering (6.3). This is seen from the fact that for the logistic distribution f [F-'(u)= u (1-u) Let us now return to Problem 3 and provide examples of some situations in which G has a more effective shape than F by being lighter-tailed according to the definition (6.2). Suppose for example that G is uniform (or has any other distribution whose density g is bounded away from 0 and oo on its support). It then follows from (6.2) that the shape of G is more effective than that of any distribution F with bounded density, and that it is strictly more effective if the bounded density of F is not bounded away from 0, e.g. if F is triangular, normal, etc.
As another example, suppose that G is the triangular distribution with density g(x) 1-IxJ, -1 < x < 1.
Then g [G-1(y )] = /2(1 -y), and G is lighter-tailed than the logistic and double exponential distributions but heavier-tailed than the extrema value distribution for which f [F-1(y )] = -(1 -y )log(1 -y) (see Parzen, l.c.) 7 . The case of n observations. So far, attention has been restricted to a single observation from model (2.1) or (2.4). We shall now generalize 
